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Logics of Strong Noncontingency
Jie Fan
Abstract
Inspired by Hintikka’s treatment of question embedding verbs in [8]
and the variations of noncontingency operator, we propose a logic with
strong noncontingency operator N as the only primitive modality. A pro-
position is strongly noncontingent, if no matter whether it is true or false,
it does it necessarily; otherwise, it is weakly contingent. This logic is not
a normal modal logic, since N(ϕ → ψ) → (Nϕ → Nψ) is invalid. We
compare the relative expressivity of this logic and other logics, such as
standard modal logic, noncontingency logic, and logic of essence and ac-
cident, and investigate its frame definability. Apart from these results,
we also propose a suitable notion of bisimulation for the logic of strong
noncontingency, based on which we characterize this logic within modal
logic and within first-order logic. We also axiomatize the logic of strong
noncontingency over various frame classes. Our work is also related to the
treatment of agreement operator in [10].
Keywords: noncontingency, completeness, expressivity, frame definability, bisim-
ulation, modal logic of agreement
1 Introduction
In his seminal work [7], beyond ‘knowing that’, Hintikka also talked about other
types of knowledge, such as ‘knowing whether’, ‘knowing who’. There, ‘John
knows whether it is raining’ is interpreted as ‘John knows that it is raining or
knows that it is not raining’, and ‘John knows who killed Toto’ is interpreted
as ‘there is a person b, John knows that b killed Toto’ (ibid., pages 12, 132).
However, Hintikka [8] gave a treatment of question embedding verbs. According
to his interpretation, the sentence “John knows whether it is raining” should
be equivalent to the sentence “If it is raining, then John knows that it is rain-
ing, and if it is not raining, then John knows that it is not raining”, and the
sentence “John knows who killed Toto” should be equivalent to the sentence
“Any person is such that if he killed Toto then John knows that he killed Toto”.
These interpretations of ‘knowing whether’ and ‘knowing who’ are different from
the ones mentioned above. His treatment also applies to many other question
embedding verbs like remember. This formal analysis is criticized in [11], but
recently adopted by researchers, see e.g., [16]. One motivation of this paper is
to formalize Hintikka’s analysis for question embedding verbs in [8].
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Another motivation is relevant to the variations of noncontingency operator.
In a non-epistemic setting, ‘knowing whether’ in the sense of [7] can be read
as noncontingency. A proposition is noncontingent, if it is necessarily true or
necessarily false. Noncontingency operator has been studied since the 1960s, see
[14, 2, 9, 12, 17, 5, 6, 4]. As a variation of noncontingency operator, essence was
studied in the literature on the logic of essence and accident [13, 15].1 There,
as the only primitive modality, “ϕ is essential” means “if ϕ is true, then ϕ is
necessarily true”, and accident operator is defined as the negation of essence.
This paper is intended to propose a strong variation of noncontingency, which
we call strong noncontingency. A formula is called strongly noncontingent, if no
matter whether it is true or false, it does it necessarily; otherwise, it is weakly
contingent, i.e., if no matter whether it is true or false, it could have been
otherwise. We denote the strong noncontingency operator by N. Intuitively,
Nϕ is read as “if ϕ is true, then ϕ is necessarily true, and if ϕ is false, then
ϕ is necessarily false”. The interpretation of the new operator is in line with
Hintikka’s analysis for question embedding verbs in [8]. For instance, in the
setting of epistemic logic, ‘ϕ is strongly noncontingent’ means that ‘if ϕ is true,
then the agent knows that ϕ is true, and if ϕ is false, then the agent knows that
ϕ is false’. Besides, this operator can count as a stronger version of the essence
operator. Moreover, this operator is also related to an alternative semantics for
agreement operator proposed in [10].
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 defines the language and se-
mantics of strong noncontingency logic, which is a fragment of a much larger
logic. In Section 3 we compare the relative expressivity of strong noncontingency
logic and other logics, which turns out that the new logic is in between standard
modal logic and noncontingency logic. Section 4 investigates the frame defin-
ability for strong noncontingency logic. A notion of bisimulation and that of
bisimulation contraction for strong noncontingency logic are proposed in Section
5. Based on the bisimulation, we characterize this logic as (strongly noncontin-
gent) bisimulation invariant fragment of standard modal logic and of first-order
logic. Sections 6 and 7 axiomatize strong noncontingency logic over various
classes of frames. Section 8 compares our work with [10]. We conclude with
some future work in Section 9.
2 Language and Semantics
First, we introduce various extensions of the language of classical propositional
logic, although we will mainly focus on the language of strong noncontingency
logic.
Definition 1 (Language L(,∆, ◦,N)). Given a set P of propositional vari-
ables, the logical language L(,∆, ◦,N) is defined as:
ϕ ::= ⊤ | p | ¬ϕ | (ϕ ∧ ϕ) | ϕ | ∆ϕ | ◦ϕ | Nϕ
1As pointed out in [15, page 94], “the work in [13] can be seen as a variation and continu-
ation of the work done on [non]contingency logics.”
2
Without any modal constructs, we obtain the language L of classical proposi-
tional logic; with the only modal construct ϕ, we obtain the language L() of
modal logic; with the only modal construct ∆ϕ, we obtain the language L(∆) of
noncontingency logic; with the only modal construct ◦ϕ, we obtain the language
L(◦) of the logic of essence and accident; with the only modal construct Nϕ, we
obtain the language L(N) of strong noncontingency logic. Given any language
L in question, if ϕ ∈ L, we say ϕ is an L-formula.
We always omit the parentheses from formulas whenever no confusion arises.
Formulas ϕ,∆ϕ, ◦ϕ,Nϕ express, respectively, ‘it is necessary that ϕ’, ‘it is
noncontingent that ϕ’, ‘it is essential that ϕ’, ‘it is strongly noncontingent that
ϕ’. Other operators are defined as usual; in particular, ♦ϕ,∇ϕ, •ϕ,Hϕ are
defined as, respectively, ¬¬ϕ,¬∆ϕ,¬ ◦ ϕ,¬Nϕ.
Definition 2 (Model). A modelM is a triple 〈S,R, V 〉, where S is a nonempty
set of possible worlds, R is a binary relation over S, V is a valuation function
from P to P(S). A frame F is a pair 〈S,R〉, i.e. a model without a valuation.
Given s ∈ S, (M, s) is a pointed model, and (F , s) is a pointed frame. We omit
the parentheses around (M, s) and (F , s) whenever convenient. Sometimes we
write s ∈ M for s ∈ S. And we denote by R(s) the set of successors of s, that
is, R(s) = {t ∈ S | sRt}. Model M is said to be a K-model (resp. D-model,
T -model, B-model, 4-model, 5-model, T B-model, S4-model, S5-model) if R is
arbitrary (resp. serial, reflexive, symmetric, transitive, Euclidean, reflexive and
symmetric, reflexive and transitive, reflexive and Euclidean). A K-frame and
the like are defined similarly.
Definition 3 (Semantics). Given a model M = 〈S,R, V 〉 and s ∈ S, the
semantics of L(,∆, ◦,N) is defined recursively as:2
M, s  ⊤ ⇔ true
M, s  p ⇔ s ∈ V (p)
M, s  ¬ϕ ⇔ M, s 2 ϕ
M, s  ϕ ∧ ψ ⇔ M, s  ϕ & M, s  ψ
M, s  ϕ ⇔ ∀t(sRt⇒M, t  ϕ)
M, s  ∆ϕ ⇔ ∀t1, t2((sRt1 & sRt2)⇒ (M, t1  ϕ⇔M, t2  ϕ))
M, s  ◦ϕ ⇔ (M, s  ϕ⇒ ∀t(sRt⇒M, t  ϕ))
M, s  Nϕ ⇔ (M, s  ϕ⇒ ∀t(sRt⇒M, t  ϕ)) &
(M, s 2 ϕ⇒ ∀t(sRt⇒M, t 2 ϕ))
If M, s  ϕ, we say ϕ is true at s, and sometimes write s  ϕ if M is clear;
if for all s ∈ M we have M, s  ϕ, we say ϕ is valid on M and write M  ϕ;
if for all M based on F we have M  ϕ, we say ϕ is valid on F and write
F  ϕ; if for all F we have F  ϕ, we say ϕ is valid and write  ϕ. Given
Γ ⊆ L(,∆, ◦,N), if for all ϕ ∈ Γ we have M, s  ϕ, we say M, s  Γ, and
similarly for model validity/frame validity/validity. If there exists (M, s) such
2We here use the notation &, ∀,⇒,⇔, respectively, to stand for the metalanguage ‘and’,
‘for all’, ‘if · · · then · · · ’, ‘if and only if’.
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that M, s  ϕ, we say ϕ is satisfiable. If Γ∪ {¬ϕ} is unsatisfiable in F , we say
Γ entails ϕ over F and write Γ F ϕ. Given any two pointed models (M, s) and
(N , t), if they satisfy the same L()-formulas, we say they are -equivalent,
notation: (M, s) ≡ (N , t); if they satisfy the same L(N)-formulas, we say they
are N-equivalent, notation: (M, s) ≡N (N , t).
It is not hard to show the following validities.
Fact 4.  Nϕ ↔ (ϕ → ϕ) ∧ (¬ϕ → ¬ϕ),  Hϕ ↔ (ϕ ∧ ♦¬ϕ) ∨ (¬ϕ ∧ ♦ϕ),
 Nϕ↔ ◦ϕ ∧ ◦¬ϕ,  Nϕ↔ N¬ϕ,  Hϕ↔ H¬ϕ,  ∆ϕ↔ ϕ ∨¬ϕ.
The following proposition says that our new operator N is indeed strictly
stronger than the standard non-contingency operator, that is why we call the
language L(N) the language of strong noncontingency logic. And also, the new
operator is strictly stronger than the essence operator.
Proposition 5.  Nϕ→ ∆ϕ,  Nϕ→ ◦ϕ, but 2 ∆ϕ→ Nϕ and 2 ◦ϕ→ Nϕ.
Proof. The validity of Nϕ → ◦ϕ is immediate from the semantics. Let M =
〈S,R, V 〉 be a model and s ∈ S. Assume that M, s  Nϕ, then by Fact 4,
we have M, s  (ϕ → ϕ) ∧ (¬ϕ → ¬ϕ). Since s  ϕ ∨ ¬ϕ, we can show
that s  ϕ ∨ ¬ϕ, thus it is immediate from Fact 4 that s  ∆ϕ. Therefore
 Nϕ→ ∆ϕ.
For the invalidity, consider the following model N :
s : p // t : ¬p
Since s has only one successor, we have N , s  ∆p. However, one can check
s 2 p → p, using Fact 4 we get s 2 Np, thus 2 ∆p → Np. Besides, s  ◦¬p,
but s 2 N¬p, thus 2 ◦¬p→ N¬p.
As a corollary, we have
Corollary 6.  ∇ϕ→ Hϕ,  •ϕ→ Hϕ, but 2 Hϕ→ ∇ϕ and 2 Hϕ→ •ϕ.
The following proposition states that necessity and strong noncontingency
are almost equivalent. We thus call the formula ϕ → (ϕ ↔ Nϕ) ‘almost-
equivalent’ schema (AE).
Proposition 7.  ϕ→ (ϕ↔ Nϕ).
Proof. Let M = 〈S,R, V 〉 be a model, and assume that M, s  ϕ. From the
assumption and Fact 4 it is clear that  Nϕ → ϕ. We only need to show
M, s  ϕ → Nϕ. For this, suppose that M, s  ϕ, then obviously M, s 
ϕ → ϕ; moreover, from the assumption it follows that M, s  ¬ϕ → ¬ϕ,
thus M, s  (ϕ→ ϕ)∧ (¬ϕ→ ¬ϕ). According to Fact 4 again, we conclude
that M, s  Nϕ, as desired.
The schema AE motivates us to propose the desired canonical relation for
the axiomatic systems below.
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The logic L(N) is not normal, because N(ϕ → ψ) → (Nϕ → Nψ) is invalid.
Neither is L(N) monotonic, since  ϕ → ψ does not imply  Nϕ → Nψ, as
illustrated below.
M : s : ¬p, q // t : ¬p,¬q
It is not hard to show that M, s  N(p → q) ∧ Np but M, s 2 Nq. Moreover,
 p ∧ q → q but 2 N(p ∧ q)→ Nq.
Although N(ϕ→ ψ)→ (Nϕ→ Nψ) is invalid, we have a weaker validity.
Proposition 8. Nϕ ∧ N(ϕ→ ψ) ∧ ϕ→ Nψ is valid.
Proof. Given an arbitrary model M = 〈S,R, V 〉 and any s ∈ S, suppose that
M, s  Nϕ ∧ N(ϕ → ψ) ∧ ϕ, to show M, s  Nψ. By supposition and Prop. 7,
we have s  ϕ. If s  ψ, then s  ϕ → ψ, from which and supposition s 
N(ϕ→ ψ) and Prop. 7, it follows that s  (ϕ→ ψ), thus we can get s  ψ.
If s  ¬ψ, then s  ¬(ϕ → ψ), from which and supposition s  N(ϕ → ψ) and
Fact 4, it follows that s  ¬(ϕ→ ψ), thus we can get s  ¬ψ. We have thus
shown that s  (ψ → ψ) ∧ (¬ψ → ¬ψ), then by Fact 4 again, we conclude
that s  Nψ.
3 Relative expressivity
In this section, we compare the relative expressivity among different logics L(N),
L() and L(∆). A related technical definition is introduced as follows.
Definition 9 (Expressivity). Given logical languages L1 and L2 that are inter-
preted on the same class M of models,
• L2 is at least as expressive as L1, notation: L1  L2, if for any ϕ ∈ L1,
there exists ψ ∈ L2 such that for all (M, s) ∈ M, we have M, s  ϕ↔ ψ.
• L1 and L2 are equally expressive, notation: L1 ≡ L2, if L1  L2 and
L2  L1.
• L1 is less expressive than L2, or L2 is more expressive than L1, notation:
L1 ≺ L2, if L1  L2 and L2 6 L1.
3.1 L(N) vs. L()
We first compare the relative expressivity of L(N) and L().
Proposition 10. L(N) is less expressive than L() on the class of K-models,
B-models, 4-models, 5-models.
Proof. Define a translation t from L(N) to L():
t(⊤) = ⊤
t(p) = p
t(¬ϕ) = ¬t(ϕ)
t(ϕ ∧ ψ) = t(ϕ) ∧ t(ψ)
t(Nϕ) = (t(ϕ)→ t(ϕ)) ∧ (¬t(ϕ)→ ¬t(ϕ))
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It is clear from Fact 4 that t is a truth-preserving translation. Therefore
L() is at least as expressive as L(N).
Now consider the following pointed models (M, s) and (N , t), which can
be distinguished by an L()-formula ⊥, but cannot be distinguished by any
L(N)-formulas:
M : s : p

N : t : p
It is easy to checkM and N are both symmetric, transitive, and Euclidean.
By induction we prove that for all ϕ ∈ L(N), M, s  ϕ iff N , t  ϕ. The base
cases and boolean cases are straightforward. For the case of Nϕ, it is not hard
to show that M, s  Nϕ and N , t  Nϕ (note that here we do not need to use
the induction hypothesis), thus M, s  Nϕ iff N , t  Nϕ, as desired.
As for the case of D-models, the result about the relative expressivity of
L(N) and L() is same as previous, but the proof is much more sophisticated,
which needs simultaneous induction.
Proposition 11. L(N) is less expressive than L() on the class of D-models.
Proof. By the translation t in the proof of Proposition 10, we have L(N)  L().
Consider the following pointed models (M, s) and (N , s′), which can be
distinguished by an L()-formula p, but cannot be distinguished by any
L(N)-formulas:
M : s : p // t : ¬p

oo N : s′ : p // t′ : ¬poo
It is not hard to see that M and N are both serial. By induction on ϕ ∈
L(N), we show simultaneously that for all ϕ, (i) M, s  ϕ iff N , s′  ϕ, and (ii)
M, t  ϕ iff N , t′  ϕ. The nontrivial case is Nϕ.
For (i), we have the following equivalences:
M, s  Nϕ
semantics
⇐⇒ s  ϕ iff t  ϕ
IH for (i)
⇐⇒ s′  ϕ iff t  ϕ
(ii)
⇐⇒ s′  ϕ iff t′  ϕ
semantics
⇐⇒ N , s′  Nϕ
M, t  Nϕ
semantics
⇐⇒ s  ϕ iff t  ϕ
IH for (ii)
⇐⇒ s  ϕ iff t′  ϕ
(i)
⇐⇒ s′  ϕ iff t′  ϕ
semantics
⇐⇒ N , t′  Nϕ
Therefore, (M, s) and (N , s′) cannot be distinguished by any L(N)-formulas.
However, on the T -models, the situation is different.
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Proposition 12. L(N) and L() are equally expressive on the class of T -
models.
Proof. By the translation t in the proof of Prop. 10, we have L(N)  L().
Besides, define another translation t′ from L() to L(N), where the base cases
and Boolean cases are similar to the corresponding cases for t, and t′(ϕ) =
Nt′(ϕ) ∧ t′(ϕ). It is straightforward to show that t′ is a truth-preserving trans-
lation, due to the validity of ϕ → ϕ and Prop. 7. Thus L()  L(N), and
therefore L(N) ≡ L().
3.2 L(N) vs. L(∆)
We can also compare the relative expressivity of L(N) and L(∆).
Proposition 13. L(∆) is less expressive than L(N) on the class of K-models,
D-models, B-models, 4-models, 5-models.
Proof. For the cases of K,D, 4, 5, consider the following models:
M s : p // p

N t : p // ¬p

It is not hard to show that M, s  Np but N , t 2 Np. Therefore Np can
distinguish the two models.
However, note that both of s and s′ satisfy the same proposition variables,
and have only one successor. Then we can show by induction that, for any
ϕ ∈ L(∆), M, s  ϕ iff N , t  ϕ. This means that the two models cannot be
distinguished by any formulas of L(∆).
For the case of B-models, consider the following models:
M′ s′ : p // poo N ′ t′ : p // ¬poo
Similarly, we can show thatM′, s′  Np but N ′, t′ 2 Np; however,M′, s′  ϕ iff
N ′, t′  ϕ for any ϕ ∈ L(∆).
Proposition 14. L(N) and L(∆) are equally expressive on the class of T -
models.
Proof. We only need to show that, on the class of T -models,  Nϕ ↔ ∆ϕ.
The validity of Nϕ → ∆ϕ was shown in Prop. 5. For the validity of the other
direction, given any reflexive model M = 〈S,R, V 〉 and any s ∈ S, suppose
towards contradiction that M, s  ∆ϕ but s 2 Nϕ. Then from the second
supposition, there exists t such that sRt and (s  ϕ 6⇔ t  ϕ). Since R is
reflexive, we have sRs. We have thus found two successors of s which disagree
on the value of ϕ, hence s 2 ∆ϕ, contrary to the first supposition.
From Propositions 10-14, we obtain the results on the relative expressivity
of L(∆) and L(), which was shown in [6, Section 3.1].
Corollary 15. L(∆) is less expressive than L() on the class of K-models,
D-models, 4-models, B-models, 5-models, but they are equally expressive on the
class of T -models.
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4 Frame definability
As have been shown, all of the five basic frame properties can be captured by
standard modal logic, e.g., the property of reflexivity can be captured by the
L()-formula p → p, refer to e.g. [1]. It is also shown in [17, Corollary 4.4]
that these five basic frame properties cannot be defined by L(∆)-formulas. In
this section, we do the same job for the logic L(N). It turns out that the results
are inbetween: some of the five basic frame properties are undefinable in L(N),
some is definable.
Definition 16 (Frame definability). Let F be a class of frames. We say that F
is definable in L(N), if there exists Γ ⊆ L(N) that defines it, viz., for any F , F
is in F iff F  Γ. In this case we also say Γ defines the property of F. If Γ is a
singleton set (e.g. {ϕ}), then we write F  ϕ for F  {ϕ}.
Let F = 〈S,R〉. Say R is a coreflexive relation3, if for all s, t ∈ S, sRt implies
s = t; intuitively, every point in S can at most ‘see’ itself. Say F is a coreflexive
frame, if R is coreflexive.
Proposition 17. Let F ,F ′ be both coreflexive frames. Then given any ϕ ∈
L(N), we have F  ϕ iff F ′  ϕ.
Proof. Let F = 〈S,R〉,F ′ = 〈S′, R′〉 be both coreflexive frames, and let ϕ ∈
L(N).
Suppose that F 2 ϕ. Then there exists M = 〈F , V 〉 and s ∈ S such that
M, s 2 ϕ. Because S′ is nonempty, we may assume that s′ ∈ S′. Define a
valuation V ′ on F ′ as p ∈ V ′(s′) iff p ∈ V (s) for all p ∈ P. Since F and F ′ are
both coreflexive, both s and s′ can at most see itself. By induction on ψ ∈ L(N),
we can show that for every ψ ∈ L(N), M, s  ψ iffM′, s′  ψ (note that for the
case of Nϕ, we do not need the induction hypothesis here). Thus M′, s′ 2 ϕ,
and therefore F ′ 2 ϕ. The converse is similar.
Proposition 18. The frame properties of seriality, reflexivity, and endpointed-
ness are not definable in L(N).
Proof. We adjust the example in Prop. 10, i.e., consider the following two
frames:
F : s

F ′ : t
Both frames are coreflexive. By Prop. 17, we have: for every ϕ ∈ L(N),
F  ϕ iff F ′  ϕ. Notice that F is serial (resp. reflexive), while F ′ is not; F ′ is
an endpoint frame, but F is not.
The argument now continues as follows. Consider seriality: if seriality were
defined by a set Γ of L(N)-formulas, then as F is serial, then F  Γ. As F and
F ′ satisfy the same L(N)-formulas, we should also have F ′  Γ, thus F ′ should
be serial. However, F ′ is not serial. Therefore, seriality is not definable in L(N).
The similar argument goes for the other cases.
3The terminology coreflexive relation is taken from the website
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Coreflexive_relation .
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Transitivity and Euclidicity are also undefinable with L(N), though the proof
is a little more tricky.
Proposition 19. The frame properties of transitivity and Euclidicity are not
definable in L(N).
Proof. Consider the following frames:
F : s // too F ′ : s′

We first show that (⋆): for any ϕ ∈ L(N), F , s  ϕ iff F , t  ϕ. The proof is
by induction on ϕ. The nontrivial case is Nϕ. In this case F , s  Nϕ iff for all
M based on F , (M, s  ϕ iff M, t  ϕ) iff F , t  Nϕ.
We have thus shown (⋆), which implies F  Nϕ. Besides, F ′  Nϕ. We can
now show by induction on ϕ ∈ L(N) that F  ϕ iff F ′  ϕ (note that for the
case of Nϕ, we do not need the induction hypothesis here).
Observe that F ′ is transitive and Euclidean, while F is not (sRt, tRs but it
is not the case that sRs, thus F is not transitive; sRt, sRt but it is not the case
that tRt, thus F is not Euclidian).
The argument now continues as follows. Consider transitivity: if transitivity
were defined by a set Γ of L(N)-formulas, then as F ′ is transitive, then F ′  Γ.
As F and F ′ satisfy the same L(N)-formulas, we should also have F  Γ, thus
F should be transitive. However, F is not transitive. Therefore, transitivity is
not definable in L(N).
The argument is similar for the case of Euclidicity.
In spite of so many undefinability results, we have the following definability
results.
Proposition 20. The property of symmetry is definable in L(N).
Proof. Let F = 〈S,R〉 be a frame. We claim that symmetry is defined by the
L(N)-formula p→ N(Np→ p), i.e.,
F  ∀x∀y(xRy → yRx) iff F  p→ N(Np→ p).
Suppose that F is symmetric. Given any model M based on F and any s ∈
S, assume towards contradiction that M, s  p but M, s 2 N(Np → p). Then
s  Np → p, and thus there exists t ∈ S such that sRt and M, t  ¬(Np → p),
hence t  Np and t  ¬p, i.e., t  ¬p ∧ N¬p. Since sRt and R is symmetric,
we have tRs. By semantics of N, we conclude that s  ¬p, contrary to the
assumption.
Suppose that F is not symmetric, that is, there are s, t such that sRt but
not tRs. Clearly, s 6= t. Define a valuation V on F as V (p) = {s}. Then
〈F , V 〉, s  p, thus s  Np → p. Since t 6= s, and s is not reachable from t, it
follows that t 2 p, and for all u such that tRu, we have u 6= s, thus u 2 p. This
implies t  Np, and then t 2 Np → p, and hence s 2 N(Np → p). Therefore
〈F , V 〉, s 2 p→ N(Np→ p), which implies that F 2 p→ N(Np→ p).
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Proposition 21. The frame property of coreflexivity is definable in L(N).
Proof. Consider the L(N)-formula Np. We show that for each frame F = 〈S,R〉,
F  Np iff F  ∀x∀y(xRy → x = y).
‘If’: Suppose that F  ∀x∀y(xRy → x = y). Then given any M = 〈F , V 〉
and any s ∈ S, if for each t with sRt, we have s = t, then s  p iff t  p, and
thus s  Np, therefore F  Np.
‘Only if’: Suppose that F 2 ∀x∀y(xRy → x = y). Then there exist s, t ∈ S
such that sRt but s 6= t. Define a valuation V on F such that V (p) = {s}, then
s  p but t 2 p, and thus 〈F , V 〉, s 2 Np, therefore F 2 Np.
As mentioned before, all of the five basic frame properties are definable in
L(), but not definable in L(∆); however, in L(N), some of the properties in
question are undefinable, some of them is definable. This can be explain in
terms of the fact that the expressivity of L(N) is in between that of L() and
that of L(∆) (see Prop. 10 and Prop. 13).
5 Bisimulation and Characterization results
In this section, we propose a notion of bisimulation for the logic L(N), and
define a notion of bisimulation contraction for the same logic. Based on this
bisimulation, we characterize the strong noncontingency logic within standard
modal logic and within first-order logic.
5.1 Bisimulation
First, let us introduce the standard notion of bisimulation, which we call -
bisimulation.
Definition 22 (-bisimulation). Let M = 〈S,R, V 〉 and M′ = 〈S′, R′, V ′〉 be
models. A nonempty binary relation Z over S is called a -bisimulation between
M and M′, if sZs′ implies the following conditions hold:
(Inv) for all p ∈ P, s ∈ V (p) iff s′ ∈ V ′(p);
(-Forth) if sRt, then there exists t′ ∈ S′ such that s′R′t′ and tZt′;
(-Back) if s′R′t′, then there exists t ∈ S such that sRt and tZt′.
We say that (M, s) and (M′, s′) are -bisimilar, notation: (M, s) ↔
(M′, s′), if there exists a -bisimulation Z between M and M′ such that sZs′.
-bisimulation is a notion tailored to standard modal logic L(). Under
this notion, it is shown that L()-formulas are invariant under -bisimulation,
thus L() cannot distinguish -bisimilar models, and on image-finite models
(or even L()-saturated models)4, -equivalence coincides with -bisimilarity
(c.f., e.g. [1]). The following property of bisimilarity will be used in the sequel.
4Given a model M = 〈S,R, V 〉, M is said to be image-finite, if for any s ∈ S, the set R(s)
is finite; M is said to be L()-saturated, if for any Γ ⊆ L() and any s ∈ S, if all of finite
subsets of Γ are satisfiable in R(s), then Γ is also satisfiable in R(s).
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Proposition 23. Let M = 〈S,R, V 〉 and M′ = 〈S′, R′, V ′〉 be two models, and
s ∈ S and s′ ∈ S′. Then (M, s) ↔ (M
′, s′) implies the following conditions:
1. For all p ∈ P, s ∈ V (p) iff s′ ∈ V ′(p);
2. If sRt, then there is a t′ in M′ such that s′R′t′ and t ↔ t
′;
3. If s′R′t′, then there is a t in M such that sRt and t ↔ t
′.
Proof. Follows directly from the fact that↔ is a -bisimulation and the defin-
ition of -bisimulation.
However, the notion of -bisimulation is too refined for the logic L(N), as
will be shown below. The following example arises in the proof of Prop. 10:
M : s : p

N : t : p
It is not hard to show thatM and N are both image-finite models, and that
(M, s) and (N , t) satisfy the same L(N)-formulas, but they are not -bisimilar.
Therefore, we need to redefine a suitable bisimulation notion for L(N).
Definition 24 (N-bisimulation). Let M = 〈S,R, V 〉. A nonempty binary rela-
tion Z over S is called a N-bisimulation onM, if sZs′ implies that the following
conditions are satisfied:
(Inv) for all p ∈ P, s ∈ V (p) iff s′ ∈ V (p);
(N-Forth) if sRt and (s, t) /∈ Z for some t, then there is a t′ such that s′Rt′
and tZt′;
(N-Back) if s′Rt′ and (s′, t′) /∈ Z for some t′, then there is a t such that sRt
and tZt′.
We say that (M, s) and (M′, s′) are N-bisimilar, notation: (M, s) ↔N
(M′, s′), if there exists a N-bisimulation Z on the disjoint union of M and
M′ such that sZs′.
Proposition 25. If Z and Z ′ are both N-bisimulations on M, then Z ∪ Z ′ is
also a N-bisimulation on M.
Proof. Suppose that Z and Z ′ are both N-bisimulations on M, to show Z ∪ Z ′
is also a N-bisimulation on M. Obviously, Z ∪ Z ′ is nonempty, since Z and Z ′
are both nonempty. We need to check that Z ∪Z ′ satisfies the three conditions
of N-bisimulation. For this, assume that (s, s′) ∈ Z ∪ Z ′. Then sZs′ or sZ ′s′.
(Inv): If sZs′, then as Z is a N-bisimulation, we have: given any p ∈ P,
s ∈ V (p) iff s′ ∈ V (p); if sZ ′s′, then as Z ′ is a N-bisimulation, we also have:
given any p ∈ P, s ∈ V (p) iff s′ ∈ V (p). In both case we have that given any
p ∈ P, s ∈ V (p) iff s′ ∈ V (p).
(N-Forth): Suppose that sRt and (s, t) /∈ Z ∪Z ′, then (s, t) /∈ Z and (s, t) /∈
Z ′. If sZs′, then since Z is a N-bisimulation on M, there exists t′ such that
s′Rt′ and (t, t′) ∈ Z, and hence (t, t′) ∈ Z ∪ Z ′; if sZ ′s′, then since Z ′ is a
N-bisimulation on M, there exists t′ such that s′Rt′ and (t, t′) ∈ Z ′, and hence
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also (t, t′) ∈ Z ∪Z ′. Therefore in both cases, there exists t′ such that s′Rt′ and
(t, t′) ∈ Z ∪ Z ′.
(N-Back): The proof is similar to that of (N-Forth).
Thus we can build more sophisticated N-bisimulations from the simpler N-
bisimulations. In particular, by Def. 24, we can see that N-bisimilarity is the
largest N-bisimulation. And also, N-bisimilarity is an equivalence relation. Note
that the proof is highly nontrivial.
Proposition 26. The N-bisimilarity ↔N is an equivalence relation.
Proof. We need only show that ↔N satisfies the three properties of an equival-
ence relation.
Reflexivity: Given any model M = 〈S,R, V 〉 and s ∈ S, to show that
(M, s) ↔N (M, s). For this, define Z = {(w,w) | w ∈ S}. First, Z is
nonempty, as sZs. We need only show that Z satisfies the three conditions
of N-bisimulation. Suppose that wZw.
It is obvious that w and w satisfy the same propositional variables, thus
(Inv) holds; suppose that wRt and (w, t) /∈ Z for some t ∈ S, then obviously,
there exists t′ = t such that wRt′ and tZt′, thus (N-Forth) holds; the proof of
(N-Back) is analogous.
Symmetry: Given any models M = 〈S,R, V 〉 and M′ = 〈S′, R′, V ′〉 and
s ∈ S and s′ ∈ S′, assume that (M, s) ↔N (M′, s′), to show that (M′, s′) ↔N
(M, s). By assumption, we have that there exists N-bisimulation Z with sZs′.
Define Z ′ = {(w,w′) | w ∈ S, w′ ∈ S′, w′Zw} ∪ {(w, t) | w, t ∈ S, wZt} ∪
{(w′, t′) | w′, t′ ∈ S′, w′Zt′}. First, since sZs′, we have (s′, s) ∈ Z ′, thus Z ′
is nonempty. We need only check that Z ′ satisfies the three conditions of N-
bisimulation. Suppose that wZ ′w′.
By supposition, we have w′Zw. Using (Inv) of Z, we have that w′ and w
satisfy the same propositional variables, then of course w and w′ satisfy the same
propositional variables, thus (Inv) holds. For (N-Forth), suppose that wRt and
(w, t) /∈ Z ′ for some t ∈ S, then by definition of Z ′, (w, t) /∈ Z. Using (N-Back)
of Z, we infer that there exists t′ ∈ S′ such that w′R′t′ and t′Zt, thus tZ ′t′.
The proof of (N-Back) is similar, by using (N-Forth) of Z.
Transitivity: Given any models M = 〈SM, RM, VM〉, N = 〈SN , RN , V N 〉,
O = 〈SO, RO, V O〉 and s ∈ SM, t ∈ SN , u ∈ SO, assume that (M, s) ↔N
(N , t) and (N , t) ↔N (O, u), to show that (M, s) ↔N (O, u). By assumption,
we have that there exists N-bisimulation Z1 on the disjoint union of M and N
such that sZ1t, and there exists N-bisimulation Z2 on the disjoint union of N
and O such that tZ2u. We need to find a N-bisimulation Z on the disjoint union
of M and O.
Define Z = {(x, z) | x ∈ SM, z ∈ SO, there is a y ∈ SN such that xZ1y, yZ2z}∪
{(x, x′) | x, x′ ∈ SM, xZ1x′} ∪ {(z, z′) | z, z′ ∈ SO, zZ2z′} ∪ {(x, x′) | x, x′ ∈
SM, there are y, y′ ∈ SN such that yZ2y′, xZ1y, x′Z1y′} ∪ {(z, z′) | z, z′ ∈
SO, there are y, y′ ∈ SN such that yZ1y
′, yZ2z, y
′Z2z
′}. First, since sZ1t and
tZ2u, by the first part of the definition of Z, we have sZu, thus Z is nonempty.
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We need only check that Z satisfies the three conditions of N-bisimulation. Sup-
pose that xZz. Then by the first part of the definition of Z, there is a y ∈ SN
such that xZ1y and yZ2z.
(Inv): as Z1 and Z2 are both N-bisimulations, x and y satisfy the same
propositional variables, and y and z satisfy the same propositional variables.
Then x and z satisfy the same propositional variables.
(N-Forth): suppose that xRMx′ and (x, x′) /∈ Z for some x′ ∈ SM, then by
the second part of the definition of Z, we obtain (x, x′) /∈ Z1. From this, xZ1y
and (N-Forth) of Z1, it follows that there exists y
′ ∈ SN such that yRN y′ and
x′Z1y
′. Using xZ1y, x
′Z1y
′, (x, x′) /∈ Z and the fourth part of the definition of
Z, we get (y, y′) /∈ Z2. From this, yZ2z and (N-Forth) of Z2, it follows that
there exists z′ ∈ SO such that zROz′ and y′Z2z′. Since x′Z1y′ and y′Z2z′, by
the first part of the definition of Z, we obtain x′Zz′. We have shown that, there
exists z′ ∈ SO such that zROz′ and x′Zz′, as desired.
(N-Back): the proof is similar to that of (N-Forth), but in this case we use
the third and fifth parts of the definition of Z, rather than the second or fourth
parts of the definition of Z.
The following result indicates the relationship between N-bisimilarity and
-bisimilarity: N-bisimilarity is strictly weaker than -bisimilarity. This cor-
responds to the fact that L(N) is strictly weaker than L().
Proposition 27. Let (M, s), (M′, s′) be pointed models. If (M, s)↔ (M
′, s′),
then (M, s)↔N (M′, s′); but the converse does not hold.
Proof. Suppose that (M, s) ↔ (M
′, s′). Define Z = {(x, x′) | x ↔ x
′}. We
will show that Z is a N-bisimulation on the disjoint union of M and M′ with
sZs′.
First, by supposition, we have sZs′, thus Z is nonempty. We need only check
that Z satisfies the three conditions of N-bisimulation. Assume that xZx′. By
definition of Z, we obtain x↔ x
′. Using item 1 of Proposition 23, we have x
and x′ satisfy the same propositional variables, thus (Inv) holds. For (N-Forth),
suppose that xRy and (x, y) /∈ Z for some y, then using item 2 of Proposition
23, we get there exists y′ in M′ such that x′R′y′ and y ↔ y
′, thus yZy′. The
condition (N-Back) is similar to prove, by using item 3 of Proposition 23.
For the converse, recall the example in Proposition 10. There, let Z =
{(s, s), (s, t)}. It is not hard to show that Z is a N-bisimulation on the disjoint
union of M and N , thus (M, s) ↔N (N , t). However, (M, s) 6↔ (N , t), as
s 2 ⊥ but t  ⊥.
The following result says that L(N)-formulas are invariant under N-bisimilarity.
This means that L(N)-formulas cannot distinguish N-bisimilar models.
Proposition 28. For any models (M, s) and (M′, s′), if (M, s) ↔N (M′, s′),
then (M, s) ≡N (M′, s′). In other words, N-bisimilarity implies N-equivalence.
Proof. Assume that (M, s) ↔N (M′, s′), then there is a N-bisimulation Z on
the disjoint union of M and M′ such that sZs′. We need to show that for any
ϕ ∈ L(N), M, s  ϕ iff M′, s′  ϕ.
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The proof continues by induction on the structure of ϕ. The non-trivial case
is Nϕ.
Suppose that M, s 2 Nϕ. Then there exists t such that sRt and (s  ϕ 6⇔
t  ϕ). Without loss of generality, assume that s  ϕ and t 2 ϕ, then (s, t) /∈ Z
by the induction hypothesis. We obtain by (N-Forth) that there exists t′ such
that s′R′t′ and tZt′, thus (M, t)↔N (M′, t′). From s↔N s′ and the induction
hypothesis and s  ϕ, it follows that s′  ϕ. Analogously, we can infer t′ 2 ϕ.
Therefore M′, s′ 2 Nϕ. For the converse use (N-Back).
With the notion of N-bisimulation, we can simplify the proofs in the previous
sections. We here take Proposition 11 as an example, to show that (M, s) and
(N , s′) therein are N-bisimilar, rather than using simultaneous induction. For
this, we define Z = {(s, s′), (t, t′), (t, t)}5. We can show that Z is indeed a N-
bisimulation on the disjoint union of M and N , thus s ↔N s′ and t ↔N t′. By
Proposition 28, we have for all ϕ ∈ L(N), (i) M, s  ϕ iff N , s′  ϕ, and (ii)
M, t  ϕ iff N , t′  ϕ.
For the converse, we have
Proposition 29 (Hennessy-Milner Theorem). For any image-finite modelsM,M′
and s ∈M, s′ ∈ M′, (M, s) ≡N (M′, s′) iff (M, s)↔N (M′, s′).
Proof. Let M and M′ be both image-finite models and s ∈ M and s′ ∈ M′.
Based on Proposition 28, we need only to show the direction from left to right.
Assume that (M, s) ≡N (M′, s′), we need to show that ≡N is a N-bisimulation
on the disjoint union of M and M′, which implies (M, s) ↔N (M′, s′). It
suffices to show the condition (N-Forth), as the proof for (N-Back) is similar.
Suppose that there exists t such that sRt and s 6≡N t, to show for some
t′ it holds that s′R′t′ and t ≡N t
′. Since s 6≡N t, there is a ϕ ∈ L(N) such
that s  ϕ but t 2 ϕ, and thus s 2 Nϕ due to sRt. By assumption, we have
s′  ϕ and s′ 2 Nϕ, and thus there exists v′ such that s′R′v′ and v′ 2 ϕ. Let
S′ = {t′ | s′R′t′}. It is easy to see that S′ 6= ∅. As M′ is image-finite, S′ must
be finite, say S′ = {t′1, t
′
2, · · · , t
′
n
}. If there is no t′
i
∈ S′ such that t ≡N t′i, then
for every t′
i
∈ S′ there exists ϕi ∈ L(N) such that t  ϕi but t′i 2 ϕi. It follows
that t  ϕ1 ∧ · · · ∧ ϕn, and thus t 2 ϕ1 ∧ · · · ∧ ϕn → ϕ; furthermore, from s  ϕ
follows that s  ϕ1 ∧ · · · ∧ ϕn → ϕ. Hence s 2 N(ϕ1 ∧ · · · ∧ ϕn → ϕ). Note that
for all t′
i
∈ S′, t′
i
2 ϕ1 ∧ · · · ∧ ϕn, thus t
′
i
 ϕ1 ∧ · · · ∧ ϕn → ϕ. We also have
s′  ϕ1 ∧ · · · ∧ ϕn → ϕ, and then s′  N(ϕ1 ∧ · · · ∧ ϕn → ϕ), which is contrary
to the assumption and s 2 N(ϕ1 ∧ · · · ∧ ϕn → ϕ). Therefore, we have for some
t′ it holds that s′R′t′ and t ≡N t′.
If we remove the condition of ‘image-finite’, then ↔N does not coincide with
≡N.
Example 30. Consider two models M = 〈S,R, V 〉 and M′ = 〈S′, R′, V ′〉,
where S = N ∪ {s}, R = {(s, n) | n ∈ N}, V (pn) = {n} and S′ = N ∪ {s′, ω},
5Note that in order to guarantee Z is indeed a N-bisimulation, the pair (t, t) must be
contained in Z.
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R′ = {(s′, n) | n ∈ N} ∪ {(s′, ω)}, and V ′(pn) = {n}. This can be visualized as
follows:
s
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❆
❆
❆
❆
❆
❆
❆
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P
P
P
P
P
P
P
P
P
P
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❯❯
❯❯
❯❯
❯❯
❯ M
p1 p2 p3 . . .
s′
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❆
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❯❯
❯❯
❯❯
❯❯
❯❯
❯❯
❯❯
❯❯
❯
// ω M′
p1 p2 p3 . . .
We have:
• Neither of M and M′ is image-finite, as s and s′ both have infinite many
successors.
• (M, s) ≡N (M′, s′). By induction on ϕ ∈ L(N), we show: for any ϕ,
M, s  ϕ iff M′, s′  ϕ. The non-trivial case is Nϕ, that is to show,
M, s  Nϕ iff M′, s′  Nϕ. The direction from right to left is easy, just
noting that R(s) ⊆ R′(s′). For the other direction, suppose that M, s 
Nϕ. Then for any n ∈ N, we have that s  ϕ iff n  ϕ, which implies that
s′  ϕ iff n  ϕ by the induction hypothesis. As ϕ is finite, it contains only
finitely many propositional variables. Without loss of generality, we may
assume that n is the largest number of subscripts of propositional variables
occurring in ϕ. Then by induction on ϕ, we can show that n + 1  ϕ iff
ω  ϕ. Thus given any n ∈ N ∪ {ω}, s′  ϕ iff n  ϕ. Therefore
M′, s′  Nϕ, as desired.
• (M, s) 6↔N (M′, s′). Suppose towards contradiction that (M, s) ↔N
(M′, s′), then there exists a N-bisimulation such that sZs′. Now we have
s′R′ω. And also (s′, ω) /∈ Z, for otherwise s′ ↔N ω, thus e.g. s′  Np1 iff
ω  Np1, contrary to the fact that s
′
2 Np1 but ω  Np1. By the condition
(N-Back), we obtain that there exists m ∈ N such that sRm and mZω,
thus m↔N ω. However, m  pm but ω 2 pm, contradiction.
We can extend the result of Prop. 29 to the following proposition. Here by
L(N)-saturated model we mean, given any s in this model and any set Γ ⊆ L(N),
if all of finite subsets of Γ are satisfiable in the successors of s, then Γ is also
satisfiable in the successors of s.
Proposition 31. Let (M, s) and (M′, s′) be L(N)-saturated pointed models.
Then (M, s) ≡N (M′, s′) iff (M, s) ↔N (M′, s′).
Proof. Based on Proposition 28, we need only show the direction from left to
right.
Let M = 〈S,R, V 〉 and M′ = 〈S′, R′, V ′〉 be L(N)-saturated models. Sup-
pose that (M, s) ≡N (M′, s′), we will show that ≡N is a N-bisimulation on the
disjoint union of M and M′, which implies (M, s) ↔N (M′, s′). It suffices to
show the condition (N-Forth) holds, as the proof of (N-Back) is similar.
Assume that sRt and s 6≡N t for some t, to show there exists t′ such that
s′R′t′ and t ≡N t′. Let Γ = {ϕ ∈ L(N) | t  ϕ}. It is clear that t  Γ. Then for
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any finite Σ ⊆ Γ, t 
∧
Σ. As s 6≡N t, there exists ψ ∈ L(N) such that s  ψ but
t 2 ψ, thus s 
∧
Σ → ψ but t 2
∧
Σ → ψ, hence s 2 N(
∧
Σ → ψ). If for any
u′ with s′R′u′ we have u′ 2
∧
Σ, then u′ 
∧
Σ→ ψ. Since s ≡N s′ and s  ψ,
it follows that s′  ψ, thus s′ 
∧
Σ → ψ, hence s′  N(
∧
Σ → ψ), contrary to
s ≡N s
′ and s 2 N(
∧
Σ → ψ). Therefore there exists u′ such that s′R′u′ and
u′ 
∧
Σ. Because M′ is L(N)-saturated, for some t′ we have s′R′t′ and t′  Γ.
Furthermore, t ≡N t′: given any ϕ ∈ L(N), if t  ϕ, then ϕ ∈ Γ, hence t′  ϕ; if
t 2 ϕ, i.e., t  ¬ϕ, then ¬ϕ ∈ Γ, hence t′  ¬ϕ, i.e., t′ 2 ϕ, as desired.
The condition ‘L(N)-saturated’ is also indispensable, which can also be il-
lustrated with Example 30. In that example, M is not L(N)-saturated. To
see this point, note that the set {¬p1,¬p2, · · · ,¬pn} is finitely satisfiable in the
successors of s, but the set itself is not satisfiable in the successors of s. In the
meantime, (M, s) ≡N (M′, s′) but (M, s) 6↔N (M′, s′).
We have seen from Def. 24 that the notion of N-bisimulation is quite different
from that of -bisimulation. However, it is surprising that the notion of N-
bisimulation contraction is very similar to that of -bisimulation contraction,
by simply replacing ↔ with ↔N.
Definition 32 (N-bisimulation contraction). Let M = 〈S,R, V 〉 be a model.
The N-bisimulation contraction ofM is the quotient structure [M] = 〈[S], [R], [V ]〉
such that
• [S] = {[s] | s ∈ S}, where [s] = {t ∈ S | s ↔N t};
• [s][R][t] iff there exist s′ ∈ [s] and t′ ∈ [t] such that s′Rt′;
• [V ](p) = {[s] | s ∈ V (p)} for all p ∈ P.
Under this definition, we obtain that the contracted model (via ↔N) is N-
bisimilar to the original model, and that the S5-model property is preserved
under N-bisimulation contraction.
Proposition 33. LetM = 〈S,R, V 〉 be a model, and let [M] = 〈[S], [R], [V ]〉 be
the N-bisimulation contraction ofM. Then for any s ∈ S, we have ([M], [s])↔N
(M, s).
Proof. Define Z = {([w], w) | w ∈ S} ∪ {([w], [v]) | w, v ∈ S,w ↔N v}. First,
since S is nonempty, Z is nonempty. We need to show that Z satisfies the three
conditions of N-bisimulation, which entails ([M], [s]) ↔N (M, s). Assume that
[w]Zw.
(Inv): by the definition of [V ].
(N-Forth): suppose that [w][R][v] and ([w], [v]) /∈ Z, then by definition of
[R], there exist w′ ∈ [w] and v′ ∈ [v] such that w′Rv′. As [w] = [w′] and
[v] = [v′], we get from the supposition that ([w′], [v′]) /∈ Z. By definition of Z,
we obtain w′ 6↔N v′. Because ↔N is a N-bisimulation, from w ↔N w′ it follows
that there exists u such that wRu and u↔N v′, thus [u] = [v′] = [v]. It is clear
that [u]Zu, that is, [v]Zu.
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(N-Back): suppose that wRv and (w, v) /∈ Z. By definition of [R], we have
[w][R][v]. Obviously, [v]Zv.
Proposition 34. Let M = 〈S,R, V 〉 be a model, and let [M] = 〈[S], [R], [V ]〉
be the N-bisimulation contraction of M. If M is an S5-model, then [M] is also
an S5-model.
Proof. Suppose that M = 〈S,R, V 〉 is an S5-model, to show that [M] =
〈[S], [R], [V ]〉 is also an S5-model. We need to show that [R] is an equivalence
relation, that is, [R] satisfies the properties of reflexivity, symmetry and trans-
itivity. The nontrivial case is transitivity. For this, given any [s], [t], [u] ∈ [S],
assume that [s][R][t] and [t][R][u], we need only show that [s][R][u].
By assumption and the definition of [R], there exists s′ ∈ [s], t′ ∈ [t] such
that s′Rt′, and there exists t′′ ∈ [t], u′ ∈ [u] such that t′′Ru′. We now consider
two cases:
• t′′ ↔N u′. In this case, we have [t′′] = [u], then [t] = [u], thus [s][R][u].
• t′′ 6↔N u′. In this case, using t′ ↔N t′′ (as t′ ∈ [t] and t′′ ∈ [t]) and the
fact that↔N is a N-bisimulation, we obtain that there exists u′′ such that
t′Ru′′ and u′′ ↔N u′, thus u′′ ∈ [u′] = [u]. Moreover, From s′Rt′, t′Ru′′
and the transitivity of R, it follows that s′Ru′′. We have thus shown that
there exists s′ ∈ [s], u′′ ∈ [u] with s′Ru′′, therefore [s][R][u].
In both cases we have [s][R][u], as desired.
5.2 Characterization Results
As  Nϕ ↔ (ϕ → ϕ) ∧ (¬ϕ → ¬ϕ), strong noncontingency logic L(N) can
be seen as a fragment of standard modal logic L(), and also a fragment of
first-order logic. In this subsection we characterize strong noncontingency logic
within standard modal logic and within first-order logic. To make our exposition
self-contained, we introduce some definitions and results from e.g. [1] without
proofs.
Definition 35 (Ultrafilter Extension). Let M = 〈S,R, V 〉 be a model. We say
that ue(M) = 〈Uf(S), Rue, V ue〉 is the ultrafilter extension of M, if
• Uf(S) = {u | u is an ultrafilter over S}, where an ultrafilter u ⊆ P(S)
satisfies the following properties:
– S ∈ u, ∅ /∈ u,
– X,Y ∈ u implies X ∩ Y ∈ u,
– X ∈ u and X ⊆ Z ⊆ S implies Z ∈ u
– For all X ∈ P(S), X ∈ u iff S\X /∈ u
• For all s, t ∈ Uf(S), sRuet iff for all X ⊆ S, X ∈ t implies λ(X) ∈ s,
where λ(X) = {w ∈ S | there exists v such that wRv and v ∈ X}
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• V ue(p) = {u ∈ Uf(S) | V (p) ∈ u}.
Definition 36 (Principle Ultrafilter). Let S be a non-empty set. Given any
s ∈ S, the principle ultrafilter πs generated by s is defined by πs = {X ⊆ S |
s ∈ X}. It can be shown that every principle ultrafilter is an ultrafilter.
Proposition 37. Let M be a model and ue(M) be its ultrafilter extension.
Then ue(M) is m-saturated and (M, s) ≡ (ue(M), πs).
Since L(N) can be viewed as a fragment of L(), every L(N)-formula can
be seen as an L()-formula. Thus we have
Lemma 38. Let M be a model and s ∈ M. Then ue(M) is L(N)-saturated
and (M, s) ≡N (ue(M), πs).
From Lemma 38 and Proposition 31, it follows that
Lemma 39. Let (M, s) and (N , t) be pointed models. Then (M, s) ≡N (N , t)
implies (ue(M), πs) ↔N (ue(N ), πt).
We are now close to prove two characterization results: strong noncontin-
gency logic is the N-bisimulation-invariant fragment of standard modal logic and
of first-order logic. In the following, by an L()-formula ϕ (resp. a first-order
formula α) is invariant under N-bisimulation, we mean for any models (M, s)
and (N , t), if (M, s) ↔N (N , t), then M, s  ϕ iff N , t  ϕ (resp. M, s  α iff
N , t  α).
Theorem 40. An L()-formula is equivalent to an L(N)-formula iff it is in-
variant under N-bisimulation.
Proof. Based on Prop. 28, we need only show the direction from right to left.
For this, suppose that an L()-formula ϕ is invariant under N-bisimulation.
LetMOC(ϕ) = {t(ψ) | ψ ∈ L(N), ϕ  t(ψ)}, where t is a translation function
which recursively translates every L(N)-formulas into the corresponding L()-
formulas. In particular, t(Nψ) = (t(ψ)→ t(ψ)) ∧ (t(¬ψ)→ ¬t(ψ)).
If we can show that MOC(ϕ)  ϕ, then by Compactness Theorem of modal
logic, there exists a finite set Γ ⊆MOC(ϕ) such that
∧
Γ  ϕ, i.e., 
∧
Γ→ ϕ.
Besides, the definition of MOC(ϕ) implies that ϕ 
∧
Γ, i.e.,  ϕ →
∧
Γ, and
thus 
∧
Γ↔ ϕ. Since every γ ∈ Γ is a translation of an L(N)-formula, so is Γ.
Then we are done.
Assume that M, s  MOC(ϕ), to show that M, s  ϕ. Let Σ = {t(ψ) |
ψ ∈ L(N),M, s  t(ψ)}. We now claim Σ ∪ {ϕ} is satisfiable: otherwise, by
Compactness Theorem of modal logic again, there exists finite Σ′ ⊆ Σ such that
ϕ  ¬
∧
Σ′, thus ¬
∧
Σ′ ∈MOC(ϕ). By assumption, we obtain M, s  ¬
∧
Σ′.
However, the definition of Σ and Σ′ ⊆ Σ implies M, s 
∧
Σ′, contradiction.
Thus we may assume that N , t  Σ ∪ {ϕ}. We can show (M, s) ≡N (N , t)
as follows: for any ψ ∈ L(N), ifM, s  ψ, thenM, s  t(ψ), and then t(ψ) ∈ Σ,
thus N , t  t(ψ), hence N , t  ψ; if M, s 2 ψ, i.e., M, s  ¬ψ, then M, s 
t(¬ψ), and then t(¬ψ) ∈ Σ, thus N , t  t(¬ψ), hence N , t  ¬ψ, i.e. N , t 2 ψ.
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We now construct the ultrafilter extensions ofM and N , denoted by ue(M)
and ue(N ), respectively. According to the fact that (M, s) ≡N (N , t) and
Lemma 39, we have (ue(M), πs) ↔N (ue(N ), πt). Since N , t  ϕ, by Lemma
38, we have ue(N ), πt  ϕ. From supposition it follows that ue(M), πs  ϕ.
Using Lemma 38 again, we conclude that M, s  ϕ.
Theorem 41. A first-order formula is equivalent to an L(N)-formula iff it is
invariant under N-bisimulation.
Proof. Based on Prop. 28, we need only show the direction from right to left. For
this, suppose that a first-order formula α is invariant under N-bisimulation, then
by Prop. 27, we have that α is also invariant under -bisimulation. From van
Benthem Characterization Theorem (cf. e.g. [1]), it follows that α is equivalent
to an L()-formula ϕ. From this and supposition, it follows that ϕ is invariant
under N-bisimulation. Applying Thm. 40, ϕ is equivalent to an L(N)-formula.
Therefore, α is equivalent to an L(N)-formula.
6 Axiomatization: Minimal system
In this section, we present a complete axiomatic system for L(N) over the class
of all frames.
6.1 Axiomatic system and soundness
Definition 42 (Axiomatic system KN). The axiomatic system KN consists of
all propositional tautologies (TAUT), uniform substitution (US), modus ponens
(MP), plus the following axioms and inference rule:
N⊤ N⊤
N¬ N¬p↔ Np
N∧ Np ∧Nq → N(p ∧ q)
R From ϕ→ ψ infer Nϕ ∧ ϕ→ Nψ
A derivation from Γ to ϕ in KN, notation: Γ ⊢KN ϕ, is a finite sequence of
L(N)-formulas in which each formula is either an instantiation of an axiom, or
an element of Γ, or the result of applying an inference rule to prior formulas
in the sequence. Formula ϕ is provable in KN, or a theorem, notation: ⊢ ϕ, if
there is a derivation from the empty set ∅ to ϕ in KN.
Intuitively, Axiom N⊤ means that tautologies are always strongly noncon-
tingent; Axiom N¬ says that a formula is strongly noncontingent is the same
as its negation is strongly noncontingent; Axiom N∧ states that if two formulas
are strongly noncontingent, then so is their conjunction; Rule R stipulates the
almost monotonicity of the strong noncontingency operator.
Note that when it comes to completeness, Axiom N⊤ is indispensable in the
system KN, because the subsystem KN − N⊤ is incomplete. To see this, define
an auxiliary semantics  as the same as , except that all formulas of the form
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Nϕ are interpreted as false. One can check the system KN − N⊤ is sound with
respect to the new semantics , but N⊤ is not valid, which entails that N⊤ is
not provable in KN − N⊤. On the other hand, N⊤ is valid under the standard
semantics . Therefore, KN−N⊤ is not complete with respect to the semantics
.
By induction on n ∈ N, using Axiom N∧ we have
Fact 43. For all n ∈ N, ⊢ Nϕ1 ∧ · · · ∧ Nϕn → N(ϕ1 ∧ · · · ∧ ϕn).
Proposition 44 (Soundness). The axiomatic system KN is sound with respect
to the class of all frames.
Proof. The validity of Axioms N⊤ and N¬ are immediate from the semantics.
For Axiom N∧, given an arbitrary model M = 〈S,R, V 〉 and any s ∈ S,
suppose that M, s  Np ∧ Nq, to show M, s  N(p ∧ q). First assume that
s  p ∧ q. Let t ∈ S be arbitrary such that sRt. By assumption s  p and
supposition s  Np, we obtain t  p. By assumption s  q and supposition
s  Nq, we have t  q, and then t  p ∧ q. We have thus shown that s  p ∧ q
implies for all t with sRt, t  p ∧ q. Analogously, we can show that s 2 p ∧ q
implies for all t with sRt, t 2 p ∧ q. Therefore, s  N(p ∧ q).
For Rule R, assume  ϕ→ ψ, we need to show  Nϕ ∧ ϕ→ Nψ. Given any
model M = 〈S,R, V 〉 and any s ∈ S, suppose that M, s  Nϕ ∧ ϕ, to show
M, s  Nψ. By supposition M, s  ϕ and assumption, we obtain M, s  ψ.
For all t such that sRt, from supposition follows that t  ϕ, and then t  ψ in
virtue of the assumption. Moreover, it is clear that s 2 ψ implies for all t with
sRt, t 2 ψ. Therefore, M, s  Nψ.
6.2 Canonical model and completeness
We proceed with the completeness proof for KN. The completeness is shown by
a construction of canonical model.
Definition 45 (Canonical Model). Mc = 〈Sc, Rc, V c〉 is the canonical model
for system KN, if
• Sc = {s | s is a maximal consistent set of KN}.
• For any s, t ∈ Sc, sRct iff for all ϕ, if ϕ ∈ s, then Nϕ ∈ s implies ϕ ∈ t.
• V c(p) = {s ∈ Sc | p ∈ s}.
The definition of canonical relation Rc is inspired by the almost-equivalence
schema AE (see Prop. 7). Recall that in the canonical model for standard modal
logic L(), the canonical relation is always defined by sRct iff for all ϕ, ϕ ∈ s
implies ϕ ∈ s. Now according to the schema AE, we can replace ϕ ∈ s with
Nϕ ∈ s given ϕ ∈ s.
Lemma 46 (Truth Lemma). For any ϕ ∈ L(N) and any s ∈ Sc, we have
Mc, s  ϕ⇐⇒ ϕ ∈ s.
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Proof. By induction on ϕ. The only non-trivial case is Nϕ.
⇐=: Assume towards contradiction that Nϕ ∈ s but M, s 2 Nϕ. From the
semantics and the inductive hypothesis, it follows that (ϕ ∈ s and there exists
t ∈ Sc such that sRct and ϕ /∈ t) or (ϕ /∈ s and there exists t′ ∈ Sc such that
sRct′ and ϕ ∈ t′). If the first case holds, then from ϕ ∈ s and the assumption
Nϕ ∈ s and sRct, it follows that ϕ ∈ t, contradiction. If the second case holds,
then since ϕ /∈ s, we have ¬ϕ ∈ s. By Nϕ ∈ s again, Axiom N¬ and Rule US, we
obtain N¬ϕ ∈ s, thus ¬ϕ ∧ N¬ϕ ∈ s, from which and sRct′ we deduce ¬ϕ ∈ t′,
contradiction.
=⇒: Suppose that Nϕ /∈ s, we need to show that Mc, s 2 Nϕ, by the
inductive hypothesis, that is to show, (ϕ ∈ s and there exists t ∈ Sc such that
sRct and ¬ϕ ∈ t) or (¬ϕ ∈ s and there exists t′ ∈ Sc such that sRct′ and
ϕ ∈ t′). First, we show
1. {ψ | Nψ ∧ ψ ∈ s} ∪ {¬ϕ} is consistent, and
2. {ψ | Nψ ∧ ψ ∈ s} ∪ {ϕ} is consistent.
For 1, if the set is inconsistent, then there exist ψ1, · · · , ψn ∈ {ψ | Nψ∧ψ ∈ s}
such that ⊢ ψ1 ∧ · · · ∧ ψn → ϕ.6 By Rule R, we have ⊢ N(ψ1 ∧ · · ·ψn) ∧ (ψ1 ∧
· · ·ψn)→ Nϕ. Since Nψi ∧ ψi ∈ s for all i ∈ [1, n], from Fact 43, it follows that
N(ψ1 ∧ · · · ∧ ψn) ∧ (ψ1 ∧ · · · ∧ ψn) ∈ s, thus we have Nϕ ∈ s, contrary to the
supposition.
The proof for 2 is similar, in this case we need to use Axiom N¬ and Rule
US.
Therefore we complete the proofs of 1 and 2. From 1, the definition of Rc
and the observation that every consistent set can be extended to a maximal
consistent set (Lindenbaum’s Lemma), we obtain that there exists t ∈ Sc such
that sRct and ¬ϕ ∈ t. Similarly, from 2, we get that there exists t′ ∈ Sc
such that sRct′ and ϕ ∈ t′. Since either ϕ ∈ s or ¬ϕ ∈ s, we conclude that
Mc, s 2 Nϕ based on the previous analysis.
Proposition 47. Let X be a normal modal logic between K and T : K ⊆ X ⊆
T . The following conditions are equivalent: given any Γ ∪ {ϕ} ⊆ L(N),
(1) Γ ⊢KN ϕ (there is a derivation from Γ to ϕ in K
N)
(2) Γ  ϕ (Γ entails ϕ over the class of all frames)
(3) Γ X ϕ (Γ entails ϕ over the class of frames for X)
(4) Γ T ϕ (Γ entails ϕ over the class of reflexive frames)
Proof. (1)⇒ (2): by Prop. 44.
(2)⇒ (3): obviously.
(3)⇒ (4): since X ⊆ T , we have X⊆ T .
(4) ⇒ (1): suppose that Γ 0KN ϕ, then Γ ∪ {¬ϕ} is KN-consistent. By
Lindenbaum’s Lemma, there is an s ∈ Sc such that Γ ∪ {¬ϕ} ⊆ s, i.e. Γ ⊆ s
and ϕ /∈ s. By Lemma 46, Mc, s  Γ but Mc, s 2 ϕ. Moreover, that Rc is
reflexive is immediate from the definition of Rc. Therefore, Γ 2T ϕ.
6Note that Axiom N⊤ provides the non-emptiness of the set {ψ | Nψ ∧ ψ ∈ s}.
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The following are now immediate from Proposition 47.
Theorem 48. KN is sound and strongly complete with respect to the class of
all frames.
Theorem 49. KN is sound and strongly complete with respect to the class of
serial frames.
Theorem 50. KN is sound and strongly complete with respect to the class of
reflexive frames.
We have seen from Proposition 10 that there is a truth-preserving translation
function from L(N) to L(). Thus L(N) can be seen as a fragment of L().
Since L() is decidable, we have also the decidability of L(N).
Proposition 51. The logic of strong noncontingency L(N) is decidable.
7 Axiomatization: extensions
In this section, we give extensions of KN over various frame classes and prove
their completeness. Definition 52 indicates extra axioms and the corresponding
systems, with in the last column of the table the frame classes for which we will
demonstrate completeness.
Definition 52 (Extensions of KN).
Notation Axioms Systems Frame classes
N4 Np→ NNp K4N = KN + N4 4 (S4)
NB p→ N(Np→ p) KBN = KN + NB B (T B)
N5 ¬Np→ N¬Np KB5N = KBN + N5 B5 (S5)
N5′ p ∧ ¬Np→ N(p ∧ Np) KB5′N = KBN + N5′ B5 (S5)
Analogous to the case of KN, we can show that Axiom N⊤ is indispensable
in the system K4N. However, Axiom N⊤ is dispensable in KBN, and thus
in KB5N, since it is provable in KBN − N⊤, just letting p in Axiom NB be
⊤.7 Thus we can replace KBN and KB5N by KBN − N⊤ and KB5N − N⊤,
respectively. We here still write KBN and KB5N to keep consistency.
To show the soundness of systems K4N and KBN with respect to the cor-
responding classes of frames, by Proposition 44, it suffices to show
Proposition 53.
• N4 is valid on the class of transitive frames.
• NB is valid on the class of symmetric frames.
7Note that we need first show the rule
ϕ↔ ψ
Nϕ↔ Nψ
is admissible in KBN − N⊤. For the
proof refer to Proposition 63, where we do not use Axiom N⊤.
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Proof. The validity of NB on symmetric frames is shown in Prop. 20.
For N4: given any transitive model M = 〈S,R, V 〉 and any s ∈ S, assume
towards contradiction thatM, s  Np butM, s 2 NNp. By assumption, it must
be the case that there exists t ∈ S such that sRt and t  ¬Np. If s  p, then
from s  Np and sRt we have t  p, and thus there exists u such that tRu and
u 2 p. By the transitivity of R, we have sRu, which is contrary to the fact that
s  Np ∧ p and u 2 p. If s 2 p, with the similar argument we can also derive a
contradiction.
Theorem 54 (Completeness of K4N). K4N is sound and strongly complete
with respect to the class of 4-frames, thus it is also sound and strongly complete
with respect to the class of S4-frames.
Proof. Soundness is clear from the soundness of KN and Prop. 53.
For completeness, by Thm. 48, we only need to show that Rc is transitive
(recall that Rc is reflexive).
Given any s, t, u ∈ Sc, suppose that sRct and tRcu, we need to show sRcu.
Let ϕ be arbitrary, and assume that Nϕ∧ϕ ∈ s. From the assumption and sRct
it follows that ϕ ∈ t. From Nϕ ∈ s, Axiom N4 and Rule US, we get NNϕ ∈ s.
We have shown that NNϕ ∧ Nϕ ∈ s. Then by sRct again, we deduce Nϕ ∈ t,
thus ϕ∧Nϕ ∈ t. From this and tRcu it follows that ϕ ∈ u. Therefore sRcu.
Theorem 55 (Completeness of KBN). KBN is sound and strongly complete
with respect to the class of B-frames, thus it is also sound and strongly complete
with respect to the class of T B-frames.
Proof. Soundness is immediate from the soundness of KN and the validity of
NB (Prop. 53).
For the completeness, by Thm. 48, we only need to show thatRc is symmetric
(recall that Rc is reflexive).
Given any s, t ∈ Sc. Suppose that sRct, to show tRcs. For this, given
any ϕ, and assume that ϕ /∈ s, the only thing is to show that Nϕ ∧ ϕ /∈ t.
By assumption, we have ¬ϕ ∈ s, and thus N¬ϕ → ¬ϕ ∈ s. From Axiom NB
and Rule US, it follows that N(N¬ϕ → ¬ϕ) ∈ s. By supposition, we obtain
N¬ϕ→ ¬ϕ ∈ t. By Axiom N¬ and Rule US, we get Nϕ→ ¬ϕ ∈ t, and then we
conclude that Nϕ ∧ ϕ /∈ t, as desired.
One may expect that the same story goes with Axiom N5 and system
KN +N5. Although N5 can provide the completeness of KN +N5 with respect
to the class of (reflexive and) Euclidean frames (see the proof of Thm. 58), un-
fortunately, it cannot provide the soundness of the system in question, because
N5 is not valid on the class of Euclidean frames (or S5-frames).
Proposition 56. N5 is not valid on the class of 5-frames (or S5-frames).
Proof. Consider the following Euclidean (and reflexive) model M:
s : p //

t : ¬p

First, as M, s  p, M, t 2 p and sRt, we have s  ¬Np. Second, since t
can only ‘see’ itself, we get t  Np, i.e. t 2 ¬Np, thus s 2 N¬Np. Therefore
M, s 2 ¬Np→ N¬Np.
We have seen that N5 is not valid on the class of Euclidean frames (or S5-
frames). However, this formula is indeed valid on the class of symmetric and
Euclidean frames, as shown below.
Proposition 57. N5 is valid on the class of B5-frames.
Proof. Suppose not, that is, there exists symmetric and Euclidean model M =
〈S,R, V 〉 and s ∈ S such thatM, s  ¬Np butM, s 2 N¬Np. From supposition,
it follows that for some t such that sRt and M, t  Np. By symmetry of R,
tRs. We consider two cases. If t  p, then using the fact that t  Np and tRs,
we obtain that s  p. From this and s  ¬Np, then there exists u ∈ S such that
sRu and M, u 2 p. From sRt and sRu and the Euclidicity of R, it follows that
tRu, then using t  Np and t  p, we obtain u  p, contradiction. If t 2 p, we
can also get a contradiction by a similar argument.
The axiomatization for L(N) over Euclidean frames is quite involved. Recall
that unlike Axiom NB, Axiom N5 cannot define the corresponding frame prop-
erty, because the property of Euclidicity is undefinable in L(N); unlike Axiom
N4, Axiom N5 is not valid on the corresponding frames. Despite this, we indeed
have the following completeness result.
Theorem 58 (Completeness of KB5N). KB5N is sound and strongly complete
with respect to the class of B5-frames, thus it is also sound and strongly complete
with respect to the class of S5-frames.
Proof. Soundness is immediate from the soundness of KBN and Prop. 57. We
show the completeness.
By Thm. 55, we only need to show that Rc is Euclidean.
Suppose for any s, t, u ∈ Sc that sRct, sRcu, we need show that tRcu. For
this, assume for any ϕ that Nϕ ∧ ϕ ∈ t, we have to show that ϕ ∈ u. From
sRct and Nϕ ∈ t, it follows that ¬(¬Nϕ ∧ N¬Nϕ) ∈ s, then Nϕ ∈ s, namely
N¬ϕ ∈ s (for otherwise by Axiom N5 and Rule US we get ¬Nϕ ∧ N¬Nϕ ∈ s,
contradiction). Moreover, from sRct and ϕ ∈ t, we obtain ¬(¬ϕ ∧ N¬ϕ) ∈ s,
and thus ¬ϕ /∈ s, that is, ϕ ∈ s. We have thus shown that Nϕ∧ϕ ∈ s. Therefore
ϕ ∈ u from sRcu.
Consider the formula N5′ : p ∧ ¬Np→ N(p ∧ Np).
Proposition 59. N5′ is valid on the class of Euclidean frames.
Proof. Given any Euclidean model M = 〈S,R, V 〉 and any s ∈ S, suppose
towards contradiction that M, s  p ∧ ¬Np but M, s 2 N(p ∧ Np). From the
first supposition, there exists t such that sRt and t 2 p. Because s 2 p ∧ Np,
by the second supposition, there exists u such that sRu and u  p ∧ Np. Using
sRu, sRt and the Euclidicity of R, we obtain uRt, thus t  p, contradiction.
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Thus KN + N5′ is sound with respect to the class of Euclidean frames (and
also S5-frames). We are unsure whether KN+N5′ is also strongly complete with
respect to the class of Euclidean frames. We leave this for future work.
Nevertheless, KB5′
N
is sound and strongly complete with respect to the
class of symmetric and Euclidean frames.
Theorem 60 (Completeness ofKB5′
N
). KB5′
N
is sound and strongly complete
with respect to the class of B5-frames, thus it is also sound and strongly complete
with respect to the class of S5-frames.
Proof. By Thm. 55 and Prop. 59, we only need to show that Rc is Euclidean.
Suppose for any s, t, u ∈ Sc that sRct and sRcu, to show tRcu. For this,
assume for any ϕ that ϕ ∧ Nϕ ∈ t, we need only show ϕ ∈ u. From the
supposition sRct and the symmetry of Rc, it follows that tRcs. From this and
the assumption, we have ϕ ∈ s.
We can show that Nϕ ∈ s: otherwise, Nϕ /∈ s, then ¬Nϕ ∈ s. Since ϕ ∈ s,
by using Axiom N5′ and Rule US, we get N(ϕ ∧ Nϕ) ∈ s, i.e. N¬(ϕ ∧ Nϕ) ∈ s;
moreover, ¬(ϕ ∧ Nϕ) ∈ s, then from sRct follows that ¬(ϕ ∧ Nϕ) ∈ t, contrary
to the assumption.
We have thus shown that Nϕ ∈ s. Thus ϕ ∧ Nϕ ∈ s, and hence ϕ ∈ u due
to sRcu.
8 The related work
In [10, page 119], Humberstone proposed an alternative semantics for the agree-
ment operator O. Given a model M = 〈S,R, V 〉 and a world s ∈ S,
M, s  Oϕ⇔ ∀t ∈ S(sRt⇒ (M, s  ϕ⇔M, t  ϕ)).
Intuitively, Oϕ is true at s, if and only if, s and its all successors agree on the
truth value of ϕ. One can show that the semantics of O and N are equivalent.
Humberstone then gave the following axiomatization. Although motivated
in a different setting, [10, page 119] also axiomatized L(N) over the class of
arbitrary frames. We call it LA, wherein we have replaced O by N.8
PL all substitution instances of tautologies
A1 Nϕ→ N¬ϕ
A2 Nϕ ∧ H(ϕ ∨ ψ)→ Hψ
A3 Nϕ→ (ϕ ∧ N(ϕ ∨ ψ)) ∨ (¬ϕ ∧ N(¬ϕ ∨ χ))
RN From ϕ infer Nϕ
MP From ϕ and ϕ→ ψ infer ψ
RE From ϕ↔ ψ infer Nϕ↔ Nψ
Inspired by Kuhn’s definition of λ in the completeness proof for minimal
noncontingency logic [12, page 232], Humberstone defined a particular function
8In [10, note 24], it is pointed out that A3 can also be replaced with Nϕ → N(ϕ ∨ ψ) ∨
(¬ϕ ∧ N(¬ϕ ∨ χ)) or Nϕ→ (ϕ ∧ N(ϕ ∨ ψ)) ∨ N(¬ϕ ∨ χ).
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λ′ such that, for each maximal consistent set s, λ′(s) = {ϕ | ϕ ∧ O(ϕ ∨ ψ) ∈
s for all ψ}, and then defined canonical relation Rc as sRct iff λ′(s) ⊆ t. Then
he claimed that the system LA is sound and complete with respect to the class
of all Kripke frames.
We tend to find our axiomatization KN simpler, e.g. with respect to A3
above. Below we will show that the axioms/rules of LA are all provable/admissible
in KN. In the following we write ⊢ for ⊢KN .
Proposition 61. A3 is provable in KN.
Proof.
(i) ϕ→ ϕ ∨ ψ TAUT
(ii) Nϕ ∧ ϕ→ N(ϕ ∨ ψ) (i), R
(iii) Nϕ ∧ ϕ→ ϕ ∧ N(ϕ ∨ ψ) (ii), TAUT
(iv) ¬ϕ→ ¬ϕ ∨ χ TAUT
(v) N¬ϕ ∧ ¬ϕ→ ¬ϕ ∧ N(¬ϕ ∨ χ) (iv), similar to (i)− (iii)
(vi) Nϕ→ (ϕ ∧ N(ϕ ∨ ψ)) ∨ (¬ϕ ∧ N(¬ϕ ∨ χ)) (iii), (v),N¬, US, TAUT
Proposition 62. RN is admissible in KN.
Proof. Suppose that ⊢ ϕ. Then by Axiom TAUT, we have ⊢ ⊤ → ϕ. Applying
Rule R, we get ⊢ N⊤ ∧ ⊤ → Nϕ. Using Axiom N⊤ and Rule MP, we obtain
⊢ Nϕ.
Proposition 63. RE is admissible in KN.
Proof. Suppose that ⊢ ϕ ↔ ψ, we need to show that ⊢ Nϕ ↔ Nψ. From
supposition and Axiom TAUT, it follows that ⊢ ϕ → ψ. With this and Rule R,
we have ⊢ Nϕ ∧ ϕ → Nψ. Similarly, using ⊢ ¬ϕ → ¬ψ, we can obtain that
⊢ N¬ϕ ∧ ¬ϕ → N¬ψ. Then from Axioms N¬, TAUT and Rule US, we infer that
⊢ Nϕ→ Nψ. From supposition we also have ⊢ ψ → ϕ. By the similar argument,
we can get ⊢ Nψ → Nϕ, thus we conclude that ⊢ Nϕ↔ Nψ.
In this paper, we gave a simply minimal axiomatization for L(N), and its
extensions with respect to other various classes of frames, and we advanced the
research by comparing the relative expressivity of L(N) and L(), and that
of L(N) and L(∆). Moreover, we proposed a notion of bisimulation for L(N),
based on which we characterized its expressive power within modal logic and
within first-order logic. We also have results about the frame (un)definability.
9 Conclusion and future work
In this paper, motivated by Hintikka’s treatment of question embedding verbs,
and also the variations of noncontingency operator, we proposed a logic of strong
noncontingency L(N), with strong noncontingency operator as a sole primitive
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modality. This logic is not normal, since it does not have the validity to the effect
that modality is closed under material implication. We compared the relative
expressive powers of L(N), modal logic, and noncontingency logic. We demon-
strated that in L(N), some of the five basic frame properties are undefinable but
some is indeed definable. We proposed suitable notions of bisimulation and of
bisimulation contraction for L(N). Based on this bisimulation, we characterized
L(N) as the invariant fragment of standard modal logic and of first-order logic.
Last but not least, we presented Hilbert-style axiomatizations for L(N) over
various frame classes, where the minimal system is simpler than that proposed
in [10].
For further research we leave the question whether KN + N5′ is strongly
complete with respect to the class of Euclidean frames. As we have observed,
the soundness ofKN+N5′ follows from the soundness ofKN and Proposition 59.
Another direction is characterize L(∆) within L(N), since L(∆) is less expressive
than L(N) on non-reflexive models (see Proposition 13). A work related to this
is to compare the notion of bisimulations of L(N) and of L(∆). From the proof
of Proposition 13, we can check that (M, s) ↔∆ (N , t) but (M, s) 6↔N (N , t),
thus ↔∆ is not stronger than ↔N. But how about the other way around?
And also, one can consider logics in which the combinations of some modalities
involved here are contained, such as the combination of N and ∆, and that of ◦
and ∆.
Last but not least, we can compare the relative expressivity of L(N) and
L(◦). In Section 3, we compare the relative expressive powers of L(N) and L(),
and that of L(N) and L(∆), but we did not compare the relative expressivity
of L(N) and L(◦). For this, we observe that, since  Nϕ ↔ ◦ϕ ∧ ◦¬ϕ, there
is a truth-preserving translation from L(N) to L(◦), thus L(◦) is at least as
expressive as L(N). But we do not know whether L(◦) is more expressive than
L(N). Although one can show that L(◦) shares the same notion of bisimulation
as L(N) (e.g., Definition 24 and Propositions 28, 29 also apply to L(◦), see [3]),
which means the two languages have the same distinguishing power, this does
not mean they are equally expressive, because even two languages that have the
same distinguishing power does not necessarily have the same expressive power.
For example, the full language of propositional logic has the same distinguishing
power as its fragment which has only propositional variables, but they are not
equally expressive. We conjecture that L(◦) is more expressive than L(N), since
it seems to us that even the simplest L(◦)-formula ◦p cannot be expressed with
L(N). We leave this for future work.
References
[1] P. Blackburn, M. de Rijke, and Y. Venema. Modal Logic. Cambridge Uni-
versity Press, Cambridge, 2001. Cambridge Tracts in Theoretical Computer
Science 53.
[2] M. Cresswell. Necessity and contingency. Studia Logica, 47:145–149, 1988.
27
[3] J. Fan. Logics of essence and accident. Manuscript, 2015.
[4] J. Fan and H. van Ditmarsch. Neighborhood contingency logic. In
M. Banerjee and S. Krishna, editors, Logic and Its Application, volume
8923 of Lecture Notes in Computer Science, pages 88–99. Springer, 2015.
[5] J. Fan, Y. Wang, and H. van Ditmarsch. Almost necessary. In Advances
in Modal Logic, volume 10, pages 178–196, 2014.
[6] J. Fan, Y. Wang, and H. van Ditmarsch. Contingency and knowing whether.
The Review of Symbolic Logic, 8(1):75–107, 2015.
[7] J. Hintikka. Knowledge and Belief. Cornell University Press, Ithaca, NY,
1962.
[8] J. Hintikka. The semantics of questions and the questions of semantics:
Case studies in the interrelations of logic, syntax, and semantics. Acta
Philosophica Fennica, 28(4), 1976.
[9] L. Humberstone. The logic of non-contingency. Notre Dame Journal of
Formal Logic, 36(2):214–229, 1995.
[10] L. Humberstone. The modal logic of agreement and noncontingency. Notre
Dame Journal of Formal Logic, 43(2):95–127, 2002.
[11] L. Karttunen. Syntax and semantics of questions. Linguistics and Philo-
sophy, 1:3–44, 1977.
[12] S. Kuhn. Minimal non-contingency logic. Notre Dame Journal of Formal
Logic, 36(2):230–234, 1995.
[13] J. Marcos. Logics of essence and accident. Bulletin of the Section of Logic,
34(1):43–56, 2005.
[14] H. Montgomery and R. Routley. Contingency and non-contingency bases
for normal modal logics. Logique et Analyse, 9:318–328, 1966.
[15] C. Steinsvold. Completeness for various logics of essence and accident.
Bulletin of the Section of Logic, 37(2):93–101, 2008.
[16] L. Wang and O. Tai. Skeptical conclusions. Erkenn, 72:177–204, 2010.
[17] Evgeni Zolin. Completeness and definability in the logic of noncontingency.
Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic, 40(4):533–547, 1999.
28
